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Abstract 
We investigate the bimodal logics sound and complete under the interpretation of modal 
operators as the provability predicates in certain natural pairs of arithmetical theories (F’, ?2). 
Carlson characterized the provability logic for essentially reflexive extensions of theories, i.e. for 
pairs similar to (PA, ZF). Here we study pairs of theories (F’, %!) such that the gap between 
F and Q is not so wide. In view of some general results concerning the problem of classification 
of the bimodal provability logics we are particularly interested in such pairs (F, 42) that % is 
axiomatized over T by L’,-sentences only, and, for each n > 1, Q proves the n-times iterated 
consistency of LT. A complete axiomatization, along with the appropriate Kripke semantics and 
decision procedures, is found for the two principal cases: finitely axiomatizable extensions of 
this sort, like e.g. (PA, PA + Con(ZF)), (IC,, ZC, + Con(Z,Y,)), etc., and reflexive extensions, 
like (PRA, PRA + {Con(lC,) 1 n 2 l}), etc. We show that the first logic, ICP, is the minimal and 
the second one, RP, is the maximal within the class of the provability logics for such pairs of 
theories. We also show that there are some provability logics lying strictly between these two. 
As an application of the results of this paper, in the last section the polymodal provability logics 
for natural recursive progressions of theories based on iteration of consistency are character- 
ized. We construct a system of ordinal notation 2, which gives exactly one notation to each 
constructive ordinal, such that the logic corresponding to any progression along %” coincides 
with that along natural Kalmar elementary well-orderings. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we investigate the bimodal provability logics for pairs of recursively 
enumerable theories containing a sufficiently strong fragment of arithmetic, for which 
we take the Kalmar Elementary Arithmetic EA. 
According to the usual arithmetical interpretation of the propositional bimodal 
language 9(0, A) the modal operators q and A are interpreted as the provability 
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predicates Pr, and Pr, in given theories Y and f%. The provability logic for (Y, %!), 
denoted PRL(F, a), is the collection of all bimodal formulas universally provable in 
Y n % under the interpretation w.r.t. Y and 49. 
Informally speaking, PRL(F, %) specifies the amount of information on provabil- 
ity that the two theories Y and % know about each other. Thus, the bimodal 
provability logics can be viewed as specific “logics of knowledge”, the informal notion 
of “knowledge” being identified in this situation with the formal concept of provabil- 
ity. The aim of the present paper is to investigate the question what the bimodal 
provability logics may look like in general and, in particular, to characterize 
PRL(F, @) for some natural pairs of theories (5, %). 
At present very little is known in answer to either part of this question. So far, all the 
results of general character in this area come from the theory of the unimodal 
provability logics. First of all, from the results of Solovay [18] we know that, at least 
for sound theories Y and %,’ the fragment of PRL(Y, 4%) in the language 9(o) of 
q alone, as well as the one in the language of A, coincides with the set of theorems of 
the unimodal provability logic GL of Giidel and Lob. This means, in particular, that 
such fragments do not actually depend on the choice of Y and 4? and therefore are not 
too informative. 
Secondly, we know that every bimodal provability logic has to be a normal 
extension of the system CS obtained by combining the axioms and rules of GL, 
formulated separately in Y(o) and Z'(A), with the obvious mixed principles: 
Smorynski [17, p. 2031, using the uniform version of Solovay’s Completeness The- 
orem, showed that CS is the minimal bimodal provability logic, i.e. there exists a pair 
(Y-, %) of finite extensions of PA such that PRL(Y, 92) = CS.2 
Deeper information on PRL(.T, 42) can be obtained from the so-called Classifica- 
tion Theorem for unimodal logics of provability [3]. The (unimodal) provability logic 
of a theory F at a theory %‘, denoted PRL*(Y), is defined as the collection of all 
formulas of Z(o) provable in q under every arithmetical interpretation w.r.t. Y. 
Thus, PRL”(F) contains exactly those provability principles for Y which can be 
verified by means of %, and coincides with the set of all 5?(o) formulas 4 such that 
AC$ E PRL(T, 42). There exists a continuum of logics of the form PRL*(.F) [l], and 
the Classification Theorem gives a complete and explicit characterization of such 
logics within the lattice of extensions of GL.3 
t That is, for theories whose theorems hold in the standard model of arithmetic. For simplicity, in the 
following discussion we shall speak about sound theories only. 
’ C. Smorynski proved this statement in a slightly more general setup. Our system CS is, in fact, a bimodal 
fragment of his three modal logic PRL,, with the third modal operator corresponding to Peano Arithmetic 
itself. 
3 This theorem is the outcome of the work of several authors (see [2,20,7,3]). The final results, showing the 
completeness of the existing classification of the unimodal provability logics, were obtained in the paper 
[S], where the reader can also find an almost self-contained exposition of all necessary background results. 
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Roughly, the Classification Theorem states that PRL’(Y) essentially depends only 
on the relative strength of the theories Y and !f3 measured in terms of the reflection 
principles for Y provable within a. For example, if & is strong enough, then 
P&X*(9) coincides with one of the following three decidable logics: 
l S = GL{@ + d}, found by Solovay [IS]; 
l D = GL{l 01, q (oqb v q $) + 04 v q t+b}, found by Dzhaparidze [7]; 
l A = GL{l o”l 1 n 3 l}, found by Artemov [2].” 
Here the expression GL{ ... } denotes the logic axiomatized over the set of all 
theorems of GL by the schemes listed within braces and with modus ponens as the sole 
rule of inference. It is easily seen that PRL”(F) contains and thus coincides with S iff 
4? proves the Local Reflection Principle for F: 
{Pr, rQ1 + Q 1 Q a sentence}. (1.1) 
PRL*(F) z D iff % proves the Local Z-Reflection Principle for 9, i.e., scheme (1.1) 
restricted to CF-sentences Q. PRL”(F) 2 A iff, for all natural numbers n > 1, 
e k cony9-), 
where Con’(F):= Con(Y), Con”+‘(Y):= Con(F + Con”(F)), and Con(Y) denotes 
the formula expressing the consistency of Y. We shall call a theory @ satisfying this 
property injinitely confident in F. 
Thus, if 4Y is infinitely confident in Y-, PRL*(F) has to be either S, or D, or A. If the 
gap between 9 and & is not so wide, the picture of the unimodal provability logics 
becomes somewhat more complicated, but the essential feature remains: only a few of 
the modal logics extending GL may have the form PRL”(F). For bimodal logics this 
obviously entails that not all (normal) extensions of CS may have the form 
PRL(S, %). Moreover, we can naturally associate with every bimodal logic E its type 
(a)’ := (4 E y(O) 1 GI t- A#}, 
and an easy analysis shows that ( .)” surjectively maps normal extensions of CS onto 
the lattice of the unimodal logics extending GL. The Classification Theorem not only 
shows that not every type is materialized as that of a bimodal provability logic, but 
also gives a complete description of all such possible types. 
In view of these results a natural question arises: is there only one bimodal 
provability logic for each type? And, if no, what is the structure of the provability 
logics of a given type? 
A well-known theorem due to Carlson [6], which in fact was the only explicit 
characterization of the bimodal provability logic for a natural pair of theories, implies 
that there is only one bimodal provability logic of S-type. It corresponds precisely to 
4 This logic is called GL, in [l-3] 
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essentially reflexive extensions of theories, such as (PA, ZF), and is actually a maximal 
among the bimodal provability logics (for pairs of sound theories). Carlson’s logic is 
axiomatized over CS by the obvious principle: 
In this paper we study the bimodal provability logics of A-type. We shall find that, 
in comparison with the degenerate case of S-type logics, some new, specifically 
bimodal phenomena come into play here, which show, in particular, that the answer 
to the first of the two questions above its negative. In fact, the structure of A-type 
bimodal provability logics is quite rich. We shall not give a complete answer to the 
second question, but we shall exhibit some nice properties of this structure, demon- 
strating that this line of research is not completely fruitless. 
There is a fairly representative class of pairs of theories having A-type provability 
logics. These are infinitely confident III-axiomatized extensions of theories (Y-, %). The 
infinite confidency provides the necessary lower bound for PRL*(S), and the 
ZZ,-axiomatizability of (9, %), which means that %! is obtained from Y by add- 
ing arithmetical n,-axioms only, is a natural sufficient condition for PRL”(F) not 
to contain D, because it is well-known that over a theory Y containing EA 
the Local C-Reflection Principle cannot be majorized by n,-axioms only. 
Natural examples of such infinitely confident n,-axiomatized extensions of 
theories are 
(PA, PA + Con(ZF)), (ICI > ICI + Conuc,)), (1.2) 
(PRA, PM + {Con(ZC,)(n 3 l}), etc. (1.3) 
The results of this paper can be briefly summarized as follows. 
Two different bimodal provability logics corresponding to the pairs of theories (1.2) 
and (1.3) are fully characterized. Both logics are decidable and a simple axiomatiz- 
ation along with the appropriate Kripke semantics for each of them is found. 
Moreover, we show that the provability logic of (1.2) is actually the infimum of the 
class of the bimodal provability logics for (sound) infinitely confident, provably 
ZI,-axiomatized extensions of theories, and corresponds to any such jinitely axio- 
matized extension, whereas the logic of (1.3) is the supremum of this class and 
corresponds to provably rejexive extensions. We also give an example of an infinitely 
confident and provably n,-axiomatized extension (F-,4?) such that PRL(F, 42) lies 
strictly between the minimal and the maximal provability logics. 
For the case of finitely axiomatized extensions (Y-, a) we obtain a somewhat 
stronger result by explicitly introducing into the modal language a propositional 
constant c for the single formula axiomatizing % over Y. The modal operator A( .) 
which stands for provability in %! could then be understood as the abbreviation for 
q (c + .) in perfect accordance with the former provability interpretation. 
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Typical examples of infinitely confident n,-axiomatized extensions arise from 
(roughly) the following transfinite recursive progression of theories first studied in 
[19, 91: 
(Tl) F0 is given; 
(T2) FE+ 1 := Fa + Con(F-,); 
(T3) ra:= Ufl<a FP, CI a limit ordinal. 
Clearly, for all c(, p, if p + w < a then the theory FE is an infinitely confident and 
L’,-axiomatized extension of FP. Moreover, F# is finitely axiomatizable over FP for 
a a successor, and reflexive over YP for a a limit ordinal. 
In the last section of this paper we introduce a system of ordinal notation %” which 
gives exactly one notation to each constructive ordinal, so as to satisfy this property 
provably for all the notations from ZZ’. Thereby, the provability logic with infinitely 
many modal operators (a modal operator for each constructive ordinal) for any 
progression of this type along d will be the same as that along any natural Kalmar 
elementary well-ordering. This corollary generalizes some earlier results of the author 
in [4]. Modulo the results of the previous sections of this paper it is a pure recursion 
theoretic result. It is of some independent interest, because it answers a question of 
Rose [14, p. 551 about the classes of ordinals for which there are primitively recurs- 
ively built-up systems of ordinal notation. As a side remark we shall note that our 
system %” satisfies this property; therefore such systems exist up to the first nonrecurs- 
ive ordinal. 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Theories 
All theories in this paper are assumed to be first order and formulated in a language 
containing symbols for all the (schemes of) Kalmar elementary functions.’ 
The Kalmar Elementary Arithmetic EA is a theory whose principal axioms are: 
(1) defining equations for each Kalmar elementary function; 
(2) the scheme of induction for quantifier free formulas. 
Elementary formulas in the language of EA are those containing no unrestricted 
quantifiers. It is known that each elementary formula is equivalent in EA to one of the 
formf(x,, . . . ,x,) = 0, for a suitable functional symbol 1: 
C1-formulas (If,-formulas) are those of the form 3x1 3x2 . . . 3x, A (resp. 
VXl vxz . . . Vx, A), with A elementary. We write XEC, for the natural elementary 
formula expressing the predicate “x is (the Gbdel number (g.n.) of) a ,X,-sentence”, and 
5 One can as well stipulate that all theories are formulated in the language of PA and contain at least the 
theory Ido + EXP (which is exactly the fragment of EA in the language of PA (cf. [23])). 
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similarly for n, . x E St denotes the elementary predicate “x is the g.n. of a sentence in 
the language of EA”. 
We assume further that each theory F comes equipped with an elementary formula 
AxF(x) representing the set of (Godel numbers of) mathematical axioms of F-, from 
which an elementary formula Pr&(y, X) expressing the predicate “y is (the g.n. of) 
a proof of the formula (with the g.n.) x” is constructed in a standard way (cf. [8]). Let 
Pry(x) abbreviate 3y Prf,( y, x) and Con(F):= 1 Pr, rll. 
Parametric families of theories are represented by elementary formulas Ax(x) 
containing some free variables other than x. In particular, the formula 
Ax,~.(x):= Ax,(x) A x < n enumerates the canonical family F_Tn, nE N, of finite 
subtheories of a theory F. 
Two theories % and V are equivalent iff 4 and V (extensionally) have the same set 
of theorems. In this case we also write % z Y (4% = -Y- means that Ax* and Ax, are 
graphically the same formulas). 4 and V are called provably equivalent iff 
EA t Vx(Pr,(x) c) Pry(x)). 
All theories in this paper are sound, i.e. the arithmetical consequences of them hold 
in the standard model N of arithmetic. 
We will also often refer to the following three folklore facts about EA: 
(1) (Provable ,X,-completeness) 
For every Cl-formula 0(x1, . . . , x,) 
EA k Vx 1 . . . Vx,(cr(x,, . . . , x,) --* PrEA ‘o(&, . . . , i:,)l). 
(2) (Provable n,-definition of truth for fl,-formulas) 
There exists a 171-formula Tr(x) such that 
EA t- Vx EI~‘~ PrEA(x ci ‘Tr(l)l). 
(3) (Witnessing theorem) 
Zf F(x, y) is an elementary formula and 
EA t- Vx 3y F(x, y), 
then there is a functional symbol f s.t. 
EA /- Vx F(x,f(x)). 
2.2. Extensions 
An extension is a pair (F, %!) of theories such that 
EA I- Vx (Ax,(x) + Ax&x)). 
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We assume that all theories extend EA in this way. Clearly for any extension (~7, %) 
we also have 
EA k Vx (Pry(x) + Pr&x)) 
and 
EA k Conpq+ Con(~). 
An extension (F-, %) is called jinite (or jinitely axiomatized) iff 
EA E t’x(Ax,(x)+ AXE v x = rA,l v ... v x = ‘A,l) 
for some arithmetic sentences A,, . . . , Ak. Provablyjnitely axiomatizable extensions 
are those provably (in EA) equivalent to finite ones. 
The canonical family of finitely axiomatized extensions of a given theory F is 
enumerated by the formula 
AXE+,:= Ax,(x) v x = u. 
By formalization of the standard proof of the Deduction Theorem in EA we obtain the 
following lemma (cf. [8]). 
Lemma 2.1. For every theory .T 
EA E Vx VuESt(PrT+,,(x) c--) Pr,(u b x)). 
An extension (%‘“, 9’) is called a subextension of (T-, 42) iff F = -ly- and % extends 
V. The canonical family F + 92 rn, n E N of finite subextensions of a given extension 
(F-, 42) is enumerated by the formula 
Ax s+eyn(x):= Ax&) v (Ax&) A x d n). 
An extension (F-, 92) is II,-axiomatized iff every axiom of 42 which is not an axiom 
of F is a Li’,-sentence. (F-, $2) is a provably fl,-axiomatized extension iff this fact is 
provable in EA, i.e. 
EA k Vx(Ax,(x) + A,(x) v x E II,). 
In this case we also say that the theory 92 is provably III-axiomatized over Y-. 
Clearly, for every L’,-axiomatized extension (F-,42) there exists a provably Z7,- 
axiomatized (sub)extension (.F-, 42’) such that 4?!’ = 42: one can simply put 
AxW(x):= Ax,(x) v (Ax&x) A XEIZ,). 
Also note that each finite and L’,-axiomatized extension is provably ZZ,-axiomatized. 
Our next goal is to show that the provability predicate for provably U,-axio- 
matized extensions of a given theory can be represented in a specific technically 
convenient form. To this end first we need the following lemma. 
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Lemma 2.2. For any theories % and V”, if 
EA k Vx(Ax,(x) + Pry(x)), 
EA t- Vx(Pr,(x) --f Pry(x)). 
Proof. Any proof y of a formula x in S! can be transformed into that in the theory 
Y by inserting proofs of all necessary %-axioms at the beginning of y. 
This argument is formalizable in EA (as an easy induction on the length of y) once 
we can prove that the length of the resulting derivation is bounded by an elementary 
function in (the length of) y. By the Witnessing theorem one can find a function 
symbol f such that 
EA I- Vx(Ax,(x) -+ Prfv(f(x), x))), 
from which the required bound is easily constructed. 0 
Note that Lemma 2.2 holds for parametric families of theories as well. In a similar 
manner we obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 2.3. Let Y,,,, mE: N be a parametric family of theories. Then for each formula 
A(x), if 
EA k Vm Vx < m Pr, ‘A(i)l, 
then 
EA k Vm Prrm ‘Vx < ti A(x)’ _ 
Let a provably Ii’,-axiomatized extension of theories (F, @) be given. Define: 
Ax,,,(x):= Ax,(x) A lAx,(x); 
U(m):= Vx < m(Ax,Jx) + Tr(x)). 
As Tr(x) is a II,-formula and Ax,,~(x) is elementary, U(m) is (equivalent to) 
a n,-formula as well. 
Lemma 2.4. (1) EA t- Vm, x (Pr,, rTm(x)-PrF+ ~aCtij7 (x)), 
(2) EA I- Vx(Pr,(x)o 3m Pr,( r U(&)l i x)). 
Proof. Part (2) follows easily from (1). We give a detailed proof of Part (1). 
(+ ) By Lemma 2.2 we only have to show that 
EA k Vx Vm(Ax, + arm(x) + PrF+ ~cJ(+ (4). 
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Note that 
EA k vx Vrn(AX@,JX) A x d m -+ (U(m) + T?(x))) 
and hence 
EA I- Ax,,Jx) A x d m -+ Pr, r U(e) + Tr(l)l 
--f Pr,( r U(rk7 i x) 
by C,-completeness and properties of the formula D(x). 
It follows that 
EA I- Ax T + qm(x) + Ax/(x) v (Ax&\&x) A x G m) 
+ Pr, + r U(h)’ (x). 
( c ) Clearly, 
EA I-- x < m A Ax,,, (x)--* (Pry+,r,(x) A xEn1) 
+ Pr, + *rm r Tr@) l. 
On the other hand, by Zi-completeness 
EA I- TAX,,,(X)+ PrT+qr, ‘lA~e\g(i)l 
and hence 
EA k Vm t/x < m Pr, + sr,,,‘-AxqF(i) + Tr(.-2)1 . 
Lemma 2.3 implies that 
EA t Vm Prd+*r,,, ‘VX < Ijl(A~qig(~) --) Tr(x))l , 
i.e. 
EA t- Vm Pry + erm r U@)l . 
The result follows by Lemma 2.2. 0 
From this lemma we easily derive the following result. 
Lemma 2.5. For any provably ZIl,-axiomatized extension (9, +Y) 
EA I- Vx(Pr,(x) --) Pr,( r COAX j x)). 
Proof. Let U(m) be defined as in Lemma 2.4. By provable C,-completeness we have 
EA t- 1 U(m)+ Pr, rl U(k)1 
+Pr,r17, 
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whence 
EA k VmPr, '1U(rh)-+1Con(~)~. 
On the other hand, by Lemma 2.4(2) 
EA F Pr,(x) + 3m Pr, (r U(k)1 i x). 
It follows that 
EA t- Pr,(x) + 3m (Pr.& r U(ti)l i x) A Prr ri U(k) + lCon(‘?~)~ ) 
+ Pr,( r Con(42)l i x). 0 
2.3. Arithmetical interpretation 
Let Z’(o, A) be the language of propositional logic augmented by two modal 
operators q and A. For a fixed pair (Y, a) of theories an arithmetical interpretation 
w.r.t. (F-, ‘22) is a mapping of the formulas of ._!Z(o, A) to arithmetic sentences which 
commutes with boolean connectives and translates q as provability in Y and A as that 
in f?%!: 
“f-(-L) = L .I-(4 --) 44 = (f(4) +fW); 
f(N) = Pr9- rf($)l, fb#‘) = Prg rf(4)1 . 
The provability logic for (Y-, &) is then defined as follows: 
PRL(5, a):= {~E~(o, A) 1 vfs t-f@)}. 
The system CSM is given by the following rules and axiom schemes: 
Axioms 
(i) schemes of GL for q and for A in the language 9(0, A); 
(ii) A4+ q A&OC/)+A@; 
(iii) 04 + A$. 
Rules: modus ponens, #---04. 
Clearly, the provability logic for any extension of theories contains CSM. It was 
shown in [17] that there exists a (finite) extension (5, !@I) such that 
PRL(F, a) = CSM, thus CSM is actually the minimal bimodal provability logic for 
extensions of theories. If %! is a provably n,-axiomatized extension of a theory Y-, 
then by Lemma 2.5 PRL(F, +Y) contains the following additional principle: 
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CSM together with the scheme (P) is denoted just P.6 It is not difficult to show that 
P is actually the minimal among the bimodal provability logics for provably Z7,- 
axiomatized extensions of theories (cf. ES]). 
The system ICP is P together with the scheme 
(IC) Aldl, nEN. 
Clearly, PRL(T, 42) 2 (IC) iff the theory & is infinitely confident in F. 
Provability logics with propositional constants are defined in a similar manner. 
Let U(o, c) be the language of GL enriched by a new propositional constant 
symbol c and let an arithmetic sentence A and a theory F be given. An A-interpreta- 
tion w.r.t. F is a mapping f of Y(n, c)-formulas to arithmetic sentences which 
commutes with boolean connectives and translates q as provability in 9 and c as the 
sentence A: 
f(l) = L f (4 = A; 
f (4 + $1 = (f (4) -f ok)); 
f (WV = pr, ‘f(4)’ . 
PRLT[A] is the set of all _Y(o, c)-formulas provable in F under every A-interpreta- 
tion: 
PRL,[A] := (4 E T(o, c) 1 Vf Y F f(4)}. 
The canonical translation * of Y(o, A) into 3’(0, c) is defined inductively as follows: 
(1) p* = p for every propositional letter p, I* = I; 
(2) ($ + ICI)* = (4* -+ II/*); 
(3) (@)* = a(+*), (Add* = dc + 6*). 
By Lemma 2.1 we immediately obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 2.6. For any arithmetic sentence A, if% = T + A then 
PRL(.T, a) = {$J E .Y(o, A) 1 PRL,[A] t 4*}. 
This lemma enables us to reduce the problem of axiomatization of PRL(5, S!) 
to a purely modal exercise, once an axiomatization of PRL,[A] is known. Surpris- 
ingly, logics of the form PRL,[A], though formulated in a richer language, 
are usually easier to deal with (especially modally) than their bimodal counter- 
parts. 
6 Perhaps, it would be more adequate to call this system in full CSMP. Yet, as all the provability logics for 
extensions of theories contain CSM, we may omit the prefix CSM without confusion. 
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2.4. Kripke semantics 
We call the usual tree-like upwards well-founded Kripke models for GL just models. 
A Carlson model 9T is a tuple (W, M, i, It, b), where 
(1) (W, <, b) is an upwards well-founded tree with bottom node b; 
(2) M is a (possibly empty) subset of W; 
(3) It is a forcing relation between elements of W and Z(a)-formulas such that 
(a) It commutes with boolean connectives; 
(b) for all x E W 
(c) for all x E W 
XItA$ - Vy>x(yeM = yIt6). 
We write %” It 4 iff 4 is forced at the bottom node b of Y+‘-. 
A downward closed (d.c.) model YT is a Carlson model (W, M, < , It, b) such that for 
all x,y~ W, 
x<y&y~M 3 XEM. 
The following two lemmas were obtained in [17,6,12], and in [4], respectively. 
Lemma 2.7. CSM t- 4 * (YT It 4 for all (jinite) Carlson-models ?T). 
Lemma 2.8. P I- 4 G (YF IF 4 for all (jinite) d.c. models Icy-). 
For the logics in the language P’(o, c) we use the same types of Kripke models as for 
the bimodal ones. The forcing relation for _.Y(o, c)-formulas on a Carlson model 
w = (W, M, <, It, b) is defined uniquely by stipulating that for all x E W 
(and other clauses are the same as before). 
Obviously, for any Carlson model w and any 9’(o) A)-formula 4 
Remark 2.9. All the notions introduced in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 could easily be 
extended to languages containing arbitrary number of modal operators and/or 
propositional constants. 
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3. Provability logics for finitely axiomatized extensions 
Let a theory T be given. An arithmetic sentence A is called injinitely confident in 
Y iff for each n > 1 
9- t A+ Con”(T), 
in other words iff the theory T + A is infinitely confident in 9. 
Examples: Con(ZF) is infinitely confident in PA, Con(PRA) is infinitely confident in 
EA, Con(ZC,) is infinitely confident in IC, for n > m. 
In this section we characterize the provability logic with a constant for an arbitrary 
(but fixed!) infinitely confident and true n,-sentence TC. From this a characterization of 
bimodal provability logics for infinitely confident finite U,-axiomatized extensions of 
theories comes out via the canonical translation *. 
Theorem 3.1. For every injinitely conjident true III-sentence rc, PRLT[z] is decidable 
and axiomatized by the following rules and axiom schemes: 
(CL) axioms and rules of CL (formulated in S?(o, c)); 
(PC) oc -+ c; 
(ICC) c + 1 q "I, nEN. 
Let ZCP’ denote the system given above. It is trivial that for any 5?(0, c)-formula Q, 
In order to prove the converse implication first we shall describe a simple Kripke 
semantics for ZCPc. 
Recall that the depth function on a model W is a mapping d of W to the ordinals 
uniquely determined by the following condition: 
4.4 = sup{d(y) + 1 IY > x}, 
where we assume sup 0 = 0. 
A deeply downward closed (d.d.c.) model ?T is a d.c. model (W, M, < , II, b) such that 
M has infinite depth in W, i.e. for all XE W 
xeM * d(x)>w. 
Clearly, ZCP’ is sound with respect to d.d.c. models. For the completeness it is 
convenient to introduce a finite version of such models. 
Let 4 be an _!Y(o, c)-formula. A &sound d.d.c. semi-model +f is a finite d.c. model 
satisfying the following condition: 
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(*) For all x E M there exists a &rejlexive node z above x in W, i.e. z > x andfor all 
subformulas q $ offormula 4 
Note that ( * ) implies that for all x EM there exists a &reflexive node z above x 
which does not belong to M. 
Lemma 3.2. For any 2’(0, c)-formula C$ and any &sound d.d.c. semi-model W there 
exists a d.d.c. model W”’ such that for all subformulas $ offormula C$ 
Proof. Replace all the &reflexive nodes outside M by infinite chains of ordering type 
13 with the same forcing at each node and then use an obvious induction on the 
build-up of +. 0 
Thus, for the completeness of ZCP’ with respect to d.d.c. models it is sufficient to 
prove the following lemma. 
Lemma 3.3. If ICP’ hi 4 then there is a &sound d.d.c. semi-model W such that W II+ 4. 
Proof. Let n be the number of all subformulas of 4 of the form oil/. Clearly, 
ZCPck4 * GLtt q +(vc+c) A q +(c+To”+~~)+ 4, 
where for any formula II/, q ++ denotes the expression $ A oil/. 
Hence there is a finite model W such that 
(i) W” Ik 4; 
(ii) Vx~WxItoc+c; 
(iii) tlx~ W~Itc-+in”+~_L. 
Put M := {x E WI x It c}. By (ii) M is downward closed; hence to conclude that W is 
in fact a b-sound d.d.c. semi-model it only remains to check ( *). 
Suppose x E M. Then by (iii) d(x) 2 n + 1 and hence there is a chain of length n + 1 
above x in W: 
x<x0<x1< . ..<x.. 
For each subformula q $ of formula 4 there exists at most one xi such that 
It follows by the pigeon hole principle that for some z among the xi)s 
L.D. Beklemishev / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 68 (1994) 115-159 129 
for all subformulas q $ of 4. Thus, z is &reflexive and located above x. 0 
Corollary 3.4. For every .9(0, c)-formula q5 
ICP’ I- 4 o (TT It 4 for all d.d.c. models TV). 
Corollary 3.5. For every formula 4 of Z(o, A) 
ICP I- $J - (TV It 4 for all d.d.c. models YT). 
Proof. Similar to that of Corollary 3.4. To produce a d-sound d.d.c. semi-model 
falsifying a given formula 4 invoke Lemma 2.8 instead of the usual completeness 
theorem for GL. 0 
Corollary 3.6. ICP’ and ICP are decidable. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Suppose ZCP’ hL 4. We claim that there is a &sound d.d.c. 
semi-model Y’Y = (W, M, < , It, b) such that 
(i) for some x E W x Itt 4; 
(ii) M # 8 (and hence b E M); 
(iii) b is a @reflexive node. 
The model YF is constructed in three steps. 
Step 1. Using Lemma 3.3 pick a d-sound d.d.c. semi-model -I1T, = 
(W,, MO, < O, Ito, b,) such that bO Ik 4. 
Step 2. We only take this step if MO is empty. Let n be the number of all 
subformulas of 4 of the form q $. 
The model WI = (WI, MI, < 1, IF 1, b,) is defined as follows: 
l WI:= WV {tI, . . . , L”+~), w h ere tis are distinct new nodes; 
l M, := {t,,+I>; bI := t,+l; 
l iI coincides with < ,, on Wand 
l for propositional variables ItI is defined arbitrarily on {ti> and coincides with 
IF0 on “llTO. 
By the pigeon hole principle, as in the proof of Lemma 3.3, it is easily seen that there 
is a &reflexive node among { tl , . , t,, b,), whence WI is indeed a +-sound d.d.c. 
semi-model. 
Step 3. Now we have a model VI = (W,, MI, < 1, It- 1, b,) with MI # 0. The 
model %‘f is defined as follows: 
0 w:= w, u {ur, . . . ) u,}, Ui’S being distinct new nodes; 
l M:= MI u {ul, . . . , u,}; b:= un; 
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l < coincides with i 1 on W1 and 
l IF coincides with It i on W, and for all i and all propositional variables p 
Again, by the pigeon hole principle there is a &reflexive node among 
(u1, f’. , u,, b,}. It follows by a simple induction that b is also @reflexive, for all the 
uI)s and bi belong to M and force the same propositional variables. Thus, W meets 
conditions (i)-(iii), as required. 
Now we are in a position to apply a modification of a well-known construction 
from [ 181. The idea of the modification seems to originate from papers of Turing [ 191 
and Feferman [9]. 
Assume, without loss of generality, that W = (0, . . . , k) and fix any function T(X) 
with the domain M such that for every x E M r(x) > x, r(x) $ M and r(x) is a &reflexive 
node. Further, let R denote the range of r, i.e. 
R:= (r(x)Ix~M}. 
Assume also that the structure of the model W is represented within EA in a straight- 
forward Kalmar elementary way. Finally, choose a quantifier free formula D(x) such 
that 
EA t- z c* VxlD(x). 
A Kalmar elementary function h (SoZooayfinction) is defined via the (formalized) 
Recursion Theorem as follows: 
h(O):= b; 
Z if PrfF(m, r~! # Zl), z>h(x) and z$ R, 
r(h(m)) if him and 3x < m D(x), 
h(m) otherwise. 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
Here e = z denotes the formula 3n Vm > n h(m) = z. 
Note. Actually, it does not matter much what h will do if accidentally clauses (3.1) 
and (3.2) happen simultaneously. For instance one can assume that h makes a move 
by (3.2). 
Lemma 3.7. The following statements are provable in EA: 
(1) \Jx> Y(X < Y + h(x) B h(y)); 
(2) e=ove=iv ... ve=k; 
(3) Vz(z4Ru{b}~e=z~Pr~~e>i’); 
(4) Vz,y(y$R A L’=z A z<y+lPr,rL’#jl). 
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Proof. As in [lS]. Note that Statements 3 and 4 are weaker than the corresponding 
statements in the usual Solovay construction. Cl 
Proof. The (c ) side is trivial because (PA proves that) in case rc is false the function 
h is bound to leave M forever (consider the least m such that D(m) is true). 
For the (--) ) side first note that 
EA I- Vz(z$MuRr\ 3m(h(m)=z)-+~$MuR). 
Reasoning inside EA: “Suppose that h(m) = z and z $ M u R. Since M is downward 
closed and h is already outside M, clearly C! 4 M. To conclude that / 4 R as well notice 
that h can only get to R via clause (3.2), that is from one of the nodes in M. However, 
no such node is accessible from those where h could stay after the moment m.” 
Now it follows by Lemma 3.7(3) that 
EA k Vz(z~MuR~~=z+Pr,~L’>ir\~~MuR~). 
Using this fact we obtain by an easy induction on the depth of z that 
z$MuR = EA~~==zlCondc’)+‘(~). 
Hence, 
Ttrc+le~MuR, 
because rc is infinitely confident in 5. 
It remains to show that 
Reasoning in EA: “If rc then clause (3.2) will never be operative and hence h will never 
have a chance to jump to R”. 0 
For every propositional variable p, define 
f(p):= 3ZE w(e = z A zkp). 
Lemma 3.9. For each subformula $ of formula q5 and each w E W, 
(a) w Il- + implies .T k l = W +f($); 
(b) w Il+ $ implies LT I- 8 = G + if($). 
Proof. We prove (a) and (b) simultaneously by induction on the length of Ic/. The cases 
of propositional variables and boolean connectives are trivial. The case $ = c is 
immediate by Lemma 3.8. Suppose now that + has the form 00. 
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(a) If w$R u {b} then by Lemma 3.7(3) 
EA k L=ti+Pryrt>G1. 
Since w It 00, by the induction hypothesis 
F t- e > w-f(e). 
Hence, 
and 
Otherwise, if w E R u {b}, w is &reflexive. Hence, 
vz+w zlk0. 
By Lemma 3.7(l) and provable ,X,-completeness 
EA F t=G-+3mh(m)=G 
-+ PrFr3m h(m) = Wl 
+ Pr,‘L 3 WT. 
By the induction hypothesis it follows that 
.F t 2f=~-+Pr~rtf~kW 
+ Pry ‘f(O) l 
+ f(4. 
(b) Since w IhL 00, there is a z > w such that z Ik 8. Take a maximal such z. We claim 
that z is not &reflexive. Otherwise it would follow that z Ik 00 and hence a z1 > z 
would exist, such that z1 Ik 8. 
Since all elements in the range of r are $-reflexive, we conclude that z $ R. Hence by 
IH together with Lemma 3.1(3) 
F k e=w-+7PYyre+zl 
-+ 7 PrTrf(0) l 
-+lf(Uq. q 
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (conclusion). Now the claim of the theorem follows immedi- 
ately. By Lemma 3.9 
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for some x E W. Hence if 5 t f($) then Y t 4 # X and h would leave the bottom 
node b. But this could not be the case because 7~ is true and Y is sound. 0 
Corollary 3.10. For % a jinite, injinitely confident and Ill-axiomatized extension of 
a theory Y, 
PRL(T, @) = ICP. 
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 3.1, Corollary 3.5 and Lemma 2.6. 
Remark 3.11. Theorem 3.1 can be extended to the analogue of Solovay’s second 
Theorem (cf. [17, 181). Let the system ICP’+ be given by adding schemata (ICC) and 
(PC) along with the axiom 
(T) c 
stating that z is true to all the axioms and rules of Solovay’s logic S. Then 
IcP’+ k 4 0 (N kf(g5)for all 7c-interpretationsf). 
Remark 3.12. For theories .Y containing ZC1 Theorem 3.1 could easily be uniform- 
ized (cf. [l, 17]), i.e. for a given infinitely confident true n,-sentence 71, a n-interpreta- 
tion f can be found, such that for all _%‘(o, c)-formulas 4, 
Remark 3.13. Theorem 3.1 could be extended to the language with constants for 
several n, -sentences n1 , . . . , T-C, provided each q + 1 is infinitely confident in the theory 
~ + hi. 
Proofs of all these statements are obtained by standard modifications of the given 
proof of Theorem 3.1 (cf. [17]). 
4. Reflexive extensions 
An extension of theories (Y-, @) is called rejexiue (and the theory % is called 
rejexiue ouer 9) iff, for every finite subextension (Y-, Y) of(Y, a), +Y I- Con(Y). 
Let me first mention a few simple properties of reflexive extensions. 
(1) A theory % is reflexive over a finitely axiomatizable theory Y iff % is reflexive in 
the usual sense (cf. ES]). 
(2) No (consistent) reflexive extension is finitely axiomatizable. 
(3) YU 3 Y + {Con”(Y)1 n 3 l} is the minimal reflexive extension of any 
theory Y. In particular, every reflexive extension is infinitely confident. 
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Other natural examples of reflexive extensions are (EA, PRA), (ICI, PA), etc. Notice 
that if a theory @ contains the local Z,-reflection principle for a theory 9, then the 
theory Y + n,(e) axiomatized (over 27) by all n,-consequences of 92, is reflexive 
over 57 (More formally, one should construct an elementary numeration of this 
theory via Craig’s Theorem, say 
Axr + n,&) := A%-( x v ) 3 y,z<x(Prf,(y,z)r\x=zh ‘3-j’ Axen,). 
This observation gives us a number of examples of n,-axiomatized reflexive exten- 
sions, e.g. (EA, EA + ZI,(lC,)), (EA, EA + ZZ,(PA)), etc. 
In the remaining part of this section we discuss formalization of the concept of 
a reflexive extension. 
Lemma 4.1. For any extension (T-, 42), the following statements are equivalent: 
(a) EA I- Vm Pr,rCon(Y + @rriz)l; 
(b) EA I- Vx E St (Z+%(x) + Pr,‘Con(Y + i) l). 
Proof. (a) * (b). Reasoning inside EA: “Let y be any derivation of a sentence x from 
axioms of ‘$2. Clearly, y is a proof of x in Y + 9 r y. Hence, by Z,-completeness 
EA t- Prf, +LpLry(y, X) and EA t con(r, * ry) + con(r + 2). 
On the other hand, (a) implies that % k Con(Y, Q [j$ ergo % k Con(Y + 2)” 
(b) =S (a). Reasoning inside EA: “For a given me N let U, denote the conjunction 
of all axioms of 92 with g.n. < m. Clearly, the theories ._Y + U,,, and 5 + %!rm are 
equivalent and provably equivalent, as both of them are finite extensions of Y. It 
follows that % k U, and EA k Con&T + U,) -+ Con(9 + @rfi). Now (b) implies 
that & k Con(U,,,) and hence 92 E Con(Y + %rKr).” 0 
An extension (Y-, 9) satisfying either of the conditions (a), (b) of Lemma 4.1 is called 
provably reflexive. Note that condition(b) visualizes the fact that the notion of 
provably reflexive extension is invariant, i.e., that any theory provably equivalent to 
a provably reflexive one (over a fixed theory Y), is itself provably reflexive over Y. 
We also immediately obtain the following corollary. 
Corollary 4.2. For any provably rejexive extension (Y-, %!), PRL(.T, 42) contains the 
following principle: 
(R) A4 + AOC#L 
Most of the natural reflexive extensions are provably reflexive as well. An extension 
of the form (9, F + Z7,(&)) is provably reflexive iff 
EA k Vx E II, (Pr%(x) -+ Pr, r Con(Y + ~2) l ), (*) 
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because the theory 5 + n,(Y) is easily shown to be provably ZIi-equivalent to @: 
EA k v’x E n, (Pr, + n,&) c, Prr(x)). 
Condition (*) is automatically satisfied, e.g. whenever @ contains the uniform Ci- 
reflection principle for Y. We shall prove now a proposition of a more general 
character. 
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that % is a rejexive extension of a theory F. Then there exists 
a provably reflexive extension f&’ of F such that a!’ extends 92 and a!’ z 92. 
Proof. The idea of the proof is just to add all consistency statements Con(F, %!rm) 
(and iterations of them) to the theory Q as new axioms. To carry through this 
construction formally first we shall need an auxiliary U,-formula C(x, m) constructed 
via the arithmetical Fixed Point Theorem such that 
EA I- Vx,m(C(x,m)c*x=Ov~Pr~+,r,r~C(f- 1,ti)l). 
In other words, 
EA F Vm C(O,m) 
and 
EA I- Vx,m(C(x+ l,m)t,Con(~++~m+ rC(x,m)l)). 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
Lemma 4.4. The following statements are provable in EA: 
(1) Vx, m, n (m d n A C(x, n) + C(x, m)); 
(2) Vx,y,m (x d y A C(y, m)+ C(x, m)). 
Note that within PA one can obtain (1) and (2) from (4.1) and (4.2) directly by 
induction. The induction formulas, however, are too complex for this argument to 
work within EA. We get round this difficulty by applying the following lemma 
from [15]. 
Lemma 4.5. Suppose an arithmetic formula A(x) is reflexively progressive, i.e. 
EA F A(0) A Vx(Pr,,‘A(x)J + A(x + l)), 
then 
EA k VxA(x). 
Proof. Clearly, 
EA t PrEA ‘VxA(x)l + VxPrEA ‘A(x)1 
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4 VxA(x + 1) A A(O) 
+ vx A(x). 
Hence by Lob’s Theorem 
EA F VxA(x). q 
Proof of Lemma 4.4. (1) We show that the formula 
A(x) := Vm, n(m < n A C(x, n) -3 C(x, m)) 
is reflexively progressive. Thus, 
~~~mmn~c(~+i,n)~Pr,,rc(1,li)~C(%riz)l~Con(~+~rn+~C(~,ri)~) 
-+ con(F + @ rm + r C(i, ti)l) 
+c~n(F+a rm+ rC(a,ti)l) 
+ C(x + 1, m). 
Hence, 
EA F Vm,n,x(m < n A C(x + 1, n) A bEArA( + C(x + 1, m)), 
and (1) follows. 
(2) Show using (4.1) and (4.2) that the formula 
A(x, y) := Vm (x < y A C( y, m) --) C(x, m)) 
is reflexively progressive in the variable y (and with x a parameter). 0 
Next we put 
Ax,(x):= Ax&x) v 31, k < x x = W(rt, ri)l. 
Clearly, 9’ extends F and 4. To conclude that % = %’ we have only to demon- 
strate that for all n and kE N, 
42 I- C(& ii). 
This easily follows from the reflexivity of ‘??J over F and from (4.1), (4.2) by meta- 
mathematical induction on k. 
Now using Lemma 4.4 and the fact that provably in EA for all k and n, 
rCon(K, ii)1 > max(k, n), 
we deduce 
EA F Con(F + Wrm)+- Con(F + arm + {C(iT, ii)lk, n < m}) 
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+ con(5 + arm+ qh,tip) 
+- Con(m + 1, m), 
Obviously, 
EA k Vm, k Pr,,‘C(k’, rh)l, 
therefore. 
Remark 4.6. In contrast with Lemma 4.3, by constructing rather artificial numer- 
ations, one can show that, in general, reflexive extensions of theories need not be 
provably reflexive. In fact, for every theory Y there exists a provably ZI,-axiomatized 
extension % of Y-, such that $! = YU and PRL(Y, 42) = ICP [S]. An easy Kripke 
model argument (using Corollary 3.5) shows that ZCP tt(R). Hence, by Corollary 4.2, 
any such extension is not provably reflexive. 
5. Provability logics for reflexive extensions 
Let RP denote the system axiomatized by all the rules and axiom schemes of 
P together with principle (R). In this section we prove our main theorem. 
Theorem 5.1. Let & be an infinitely confident and provably III-axiomatized extension 
of a theory 9, Then 
PRL(Y, 92) E RP 
Before proceeding to the proof of this theorem let us collect a few facts about RP. 
First of all, it is easy to see that for all nE N, 
RP t- Aldl, 
and hence RP 2 ICP. We have already noted that this inclusion is strict. The 
following lemma gives us a useful principle in RP which can be thought of as a general 
form of Goryachev’s theorem [lo]: PA together with the local reflection principle 
Rfn(PA) for PA is relatively interpretable in PA,. 
Lemma 5.2. For all n 2 1 and all formulas 4, 11/I) . . . , II/" of _.Y(n, A), 
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Here Rfn(G1, . . . , $“) denotes the formula 
/3c\F= 1 tn+i + tii)- 
Proof. Given a formula 4 define a sequence of formulas CD,,, n E N, inductively as 
follows: 
@,:= 4; Qn+l:= #J A O@“. 
It is easy to see via a straightforward application of the scheme (R) that for all n E N 
RP k A$-+ A@,. (5.1) 
Now we claim that for all n 2 1 and all formulas $i, . . . , I)” 
CSM I- @n+l -+ 44 A Rfn($l, . . . , tkcln)). (5.2) 
Suppose for a reductio that (5.2) does not hold for some n 2 1. Then there exists 
a model W = (W, M, <, II, b) such that 
b IF 44 A Rfn(ll/r, . . . ,+,,)) and b )I- %+I- 
Since b It Qn+ 1, there is a chain of length n + 1 above b in W 
b<ao<al< . ..<a., 
such that for all i < n 
As in the proof of Lemma 3.3 the pigeon hole principle guarantees that for 
someidn 
ai It- Rfn(+I, . . . ,1(1,), 
whence 
ai It 4 A Rfn($r, . . . ,&I,) 
and 
b IF 44 A Rfn(lC/i, . . . ,k)), 
quod non. 
The statement of Lemma 5.2 now follows immediately from (5.1) and (5.2). 0 
Corollary 5.3. For any rejlexive extension 4 of a theory 9 the theory $2 + Rf n( Y) is 
relatively interpretable in 42. 
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Proof. By Lemma 4.3 we may assume @ provably reflexive over 5. Since by 
Corollary 4.2, without loss of generality 
PRL( 5, ‘42) 2 RP, 
Lemma 5.2 assures that for each finite subtheory V of %! + Rfn( F), 
For 4 containing PA the result now follows by a well-known theorem due to Orey 
and Feferman [S]. For weaker theories confer, e.g. Corollary 5.2 in [22]. 
Lemma 5.4. Suppose that RP tt 4. Then there exists a jinite d.c. model 
~=(W,M,<,It,b)andajiinctionr:M-+ WsuchthatbItt~andforallx~M, 
(a) r(x) is &reflexive; 
(b) r(x)+ M and r(x) > x; 
(c) x < r(y) * 3z > x(r(z) = r(y) and ZE M); 
(d) for all subformulas A$ offormula I#J 
x It A$ implies VZE M(z > x *r(Z) k II/). 
Proof. Let 0 It/r, . . . , 0 I),, and AC$~, . . . , A&, be the list of all subformulas of 4 of the 
form q r,9 and AI), respectively. For any subset S of { 1,2, . . . , m} define 
Rd4):= A/3c\,,6i --) A~(/$&-,~i * Rfn(&, ... , h/n))- 
Put 
R(4):= Asq1.2, ,,.,,,n’Rs(4). 
By Lemma 5.2, RP F R(4); hence by our assumption on 4 
P kR(4)-*6 
By Lemma 2.8 there is a finite d.c. model 9V = (W, M, i, It, b) such that 
bItt4 and for all SC {1,2, . . . ,m} and all ye W, 
Y II- R,(4). (5.3) 
We need to define a function r satisfying (a)-(d). First we define r on a subset 
B:= {x~M(Vy~xy~M}ofMsoastovalidate(a)and(b)forallx~B,and(c)for 
all the immediate predecessors of elements of B. (If there are no such predecessors, i.e. 
B c {b}, the statement of our lemma trivializes: one can put M : = 0 without disturb- 
ing the forcing relation on TV.) 
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Thus assuming M\B nonempty we fix for an arbitrary element x of B the unique 
immediate predecessor y of x and put 
S:={i\l<i<m&y It A4i}. 
Evidently, y It A /M,,~i and hence by (5.3) 
Y IF AO(nc\issd’i A Rfn(d’~, ... 9 ‘hn)). 
It follows that 
and hence there exists a $-reflexive node z > x such that 
Put r(x): = any such z. Thus r is properly defined on B. 
Now for every x EM\ B pick an arbitrary element x’ > x such that x’ E B and put 
r(x): = r(x)). We clearly have (c). 
In order to check (d) suppose that x E M\B and x Ik AQli (for x E B condition (d) 
trivially holds). For all z E B, z > x, if y is the immediate predecessor of z, then 
y It A4i. Hence by the construction of r for all such z, 
r(z) It pi. 
Consequently r(u) It pi for all u EM such that u > x. q 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We follow the scheme of the proof of Theorem 3.1. 
Suppose that RP If C#J and fix a d.c. model w0 = (IV,, MO, <o, It-,, b,) and 
a function r: M + W satisfying the requirements of Lemma 5.4. Construct a new 
model 9Y:= (W, M, <, It, b) as follows: 
W:= W, v {b), where b$ W,; 
MI= 
0 if Me G {b,}, 
MO u {b) otherwise; 
< coincides with i. on Wo and 
propositional variables IF agrees with 
node b. 
b is the bottom node of YY w.r.t. <; for 
IF0 on W, and is arbitrarily defined at the 
In case M # 0 we also let r(b) := r(b,). Obviously, for w and r thus defined b. It+ 4 
and conditions (a)-(d) of Lemma 5.4 still hold. 
As in the proof of Theorem 3.1 we assume without loss of generality that 
w= (0, . . . , k} and that the structure of ?Y is represented within EA in a natural 
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Kalmar elementary way. We also specify three (finite and hence Kalmar elementary) 
subsets of W: 
B:= {x~MlVy>x y&M}; M’:= M\B; R:= {r(x)(x~M}. 
Finally, fix a ZI,-formula U(m):= Vy U,(y, m) as in Lemma 2.4. 
Now we are in a position to define simultaneously two elementary functions h(m) 
and g(m) via the (formalized) Recursion Theorem. Whereas h is the analogue of the 
usual Solovay function climbing up within the model w, the function g measures the 
employed resources of finite subextensions of the given extension (Y-, %). 
Set h(O):= b and g(O):= 0. To define h(m + 1) and g(m + 1) consider three cases: 
Case 1: h(m)& M. Then put 
if z > h(m), z$R and Prfr(m, re # Zl), 
h(m) if there is no such z; 
(i) 
(ii) 
and g(m + l):= g(m). 
Case 2: h(m) E B. If for some y Q m 1 U,,(y, g(m)), then 
h(m + l):= r(h(m)), 
otherwise h(m + 1) is defined exactly as in Case 1; and g(m + l):= g(m). 
Case 3: h(m)EM’ if for some y d m P&(y, ‘l-l), then 
h(m + l):= r(h(m)). 
If there is no such proof select one of the following three clauses: 
(iii) 
(iv) 
i 
Z if z > h(m), z$ R and Prfr(m,‘t # .F’), (4 
h(m+ l):= z if z> h(m), zeB and Prji(m,‘t #Zl), (vi) 
h(m) if there is no such z. (vii) 
In case (vi) we set g(m + 1): = “the g.n. of the largest @-axiom occurring in the proof 
with the g.n. m”. Otherwise, g(m + l):= g(m). 
Here /’ denotes the limit of h as usual. 
We formulate and prove the following Lemmas 5.5-5.11 within EA. 
Lemma 5.5. (1) Vm,n(m < n+ h(m)< h(n)), 
(2)f=Ove=iv-.. ve=k. 
Lemma5.6. (1) Vm,x(h(m)=x A xeB AT U(g(m))+/#x), 
(2) Vx(t’= x A XEM’+ Con(%)). 
Proof. (1) Suppose that 8 = x E B, h(m) = x and 1 U(g(m)). Then clearly for some n, 
1 Uo(n, g(m)). Hence for m 1 : = max(n, m) clause (iii) of the definition of h is operative; 
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therefore h(mr + 1) = r(x)>x. It follows by monotonicity of h w.r.t. 4 that 8 # x, 
quod non. 
(2) Similarly via clause (iv). 0 
Lemma5.7. (1) Vz,y(e=~r\z<yAy~R~iPr,~e#~l), 
(2) Vx(x$#Ru{b) Ae=x+Pr~-t>il). 
Proof. (1) is easy. We check (2). 
Suppose 4 = x, x 6 R u {b}. If x $ B then clearly Y t- e # X because h cannot 
jump to x before getting a proof of C # X in F. Hence by monotonicity of h and by 
C,-completeness F t ! > X. 
Now assume that x E B and pick an m E N such that h(m) EM’ and h(m + 1) = x. By 
(v) and (vi) for e:= g(m + 1) we have %!r e !- e # X and hence by Lemma 2.4(l), 
Y F U(E)+ e # x. (5.4) 
On the other hand, by (formalized) Lemma 2.4(l) 
EA t Vm(h(m)=xr\x~B~lU(g(m))~e#x), 
whence by C,-completeness 
9 t- 1 U(C)+ e # 1. (5.5) 
Comparing (5.4) and (5.5) conclude: Y F 8 # X; hence, F I- G > 2. 0 
Lemma5.8. Vx,y(xiy~Mr\e=x-,lP~~~~#31). 
Proof. Suppose 8 = x < y and y E M. If y E B then clearly h will make a move from 
x by clause (vi) once a proof of e # jj in %! appears. And this is impossible, for we 
assume 8 = x. 
Therefore, suppose that y E M’ and !?/ !- e # j?. By Lemma 2.5, 
On the other hand, by Lemma 5.6(2) and by Cr-completeness 
9- k e=y+Con(4). 
It follows that 
i.e. 
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The latter, however, implies that sooner or later h will leave the node x through 
clause (v). 0 
Lemma 5.9. (1) Vm, x(h(m) = x A xEB A / = r(x)+ i U(g(m))), 
(2) Vx(t = x A XER-+1 Con(%)). 
Proof. (1) If x E B, h(m) = x and U(g(m)) then clause (iii) will never be operative and 
hence h will never have a chance to jump to Y(X). 
(2) The only way for h to get to any element of R is through either of the clauses (iii) 
or (iv). In case (iii) we clearly have 1 U(m) for some m. Therefore, by C,-completeness 
Y l- i U(m) for some m. 
On the other hand, by Lemma 4.2, %! I- U(m) for all m; hence 1 Con(%). 
In case (iv) we obtain 1 Con(%) immediately. 0 
Lemma 5.10. (1) For some (standard) n E N 
Proof. (1) cf. Lemma 3.8. 
(2) Follows from (l), for the theory % is infinitely confident in Y. 0 
Lemma 5.11. Vx(8 = x A xcB+ 7 Con(@)). 
Proof. Suppose that XEB and h(m) = x. By C,-completeness 
whence by (formalized) Lemma 5.9(l) 
% k e = r(X) + 1 U(g(rn)). 
Since for all m, %2 I- U(m), it follows that 
42 k- e # r(X). 
On the other hand, by Lemma 5.7(2) 
e=xEBimpliesI I- />Z 
and hence 
Y t- ~‘=r(x)vt’#MuR. 
(54 
(5.7) 
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Now by Lemma 5.10(2), 
(5.8) 
Putting together (5.6)-(5.8) conclude: 1 Con( %!). 0 
Define for every propositional variable p 
f(p):= 3XE W(x Ik p A e = x). 
Lemma 5.12. For every subformula II/ offormula 4 and every XE w{b} 
(a) x It $ implies EA k t = X-f($); 
(b) x Ik $ implies EA I- 8 = X -t 1 f($). 
Proof. By induction on the length of II/. We only treat the case rl/ has the form ~0, for 
other cases are either trivial or similar to those in the proof of Lemma 3.9. 
(a) First observe that Lemmas 5.9(2), 5.10(l) and 5.11 altogether imply 
EA t- [=%A x$M’+lCon(~). 
Consequently, for x $ M 
EA I- G=Z+Pr,rll 
Suppose now that x E M’. By properties (c) and (d) of model -W (cf. Lemma 5.4) for 
all such x, 
x k A6 iII@ieS vZEh!fUR(Z>X+Z k 0). 
Hence by IH 
EA k L>Xr\ t~MuR+f(@). 
It follows by (formalized) Lemmas 5.7(2) and 5.10(2) that 
EA + L=Z+Pr9rC>T1 
+Prqrt>T A feMuR7 
+ Pr,rf(B)l 
+f(Ae). 
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(b) Suppose that x Ihi ~0. Then for some y > x, y E M, we have y It+ 8, whence by IH 
and Lemma 5.8 
EA E t!=.?--lPr*r8#yl 
+ 1 Pr,‘f(8)1 
Proof of Theorem 5.1 (conclusion). Since the theory 42 is sound, clauses (iii) and (iv) of 
the definition of h will never be operative. Hence N k e = 6. On the other hand, by 
Lemma 10 
Iff(4) were provable in F then, clearly, it would follow that 7 F / # b0 and 
hence h would make a move from b, quod non. 0 
Corollary 5.13. ‘For any provably rejexive and provably III-axiomatized extension 
(F_, W, 
PRL(T, %) = RP. 
Corollary 5.14. RP is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of Kripke models described in 
Lemma 5.4. 
Proof. We already know that RP is complete. Take any provably reflexive and 
provably n,-axiomatized extension (F, 42). If RP were not sound, then by the proof 
of Theorem 5.1, a formula 4 would exist such that RP I- C$ and $ $PRL( Y-, 9X!). This 
contradicts Corollary 5.13. 
Corollary 5.15. RP is decidable. 
Remark 5.16. Theorem 5.1 can be extended to the analogue of Solovay’s Second 
Theorem. Let the system RP+ be given by adding the scheme 
to the set of all theorems of logic RP, and let the only inference rule of RP+ be modus 
ponens. Then 
RP+ t C#I o (N bf($)for all interpretationsf). 
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Remark 5.17. Theorem 5.1 could easily be extended to the language with several 
modal operators for a sequence of theories 
FlCFZC ... cFn, 
provided all the indicated extensions are provably reflexive and U,-axiomatized. 
Remark 5.18. A perhaps more natural kind of Kripke semantics for RP is described 
in [4]. However, those models are infinite and Lemma 5.6 is the first step in the 
completeness proof of [4] anyway. 
6. Between finite and reflexive extensions 
In a view of the results of Sections 3 and 5 it seems natural to ask, whether there 
exists an infinitely confident and provably n,-axiomatized extension (F, 42) which 
has a strictly intermediate provability logic, i.e. 
ICP c PRL(F, ?2) c RP. 
We answer this question positively by constructing an irreflexive extension satisfy- 
ing the following principle: 
(I) lhl A A~+lAOlf#& 
which apparently is not derivable in ICP. 
Let F be any theory extending ZC1 (for weaker theories the construction is slightly 
more complicated). 
Lemma 6.1. There exists a true III-sentence z such that 
(a) FU + 71 tt Con(F+ 71); 
(b) for every arithmetic sentence A, 
F k PrK+,rPrrrAl A 1 Al + Przr_L1. 
Proof. Consider the following Kripke frame %‘” = ( W, <): 
WI= (0) U(CijIi,jEN}; 
< is the transitive closure of the following relations (see Fig. 1): 
Ci+l,j<Ci,j+l for all i,jEN; 
0 < Cij for all i, jE N; 
ci+l,O 4ci,0 for all iE N; 
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: 
i ” +-II- otatement 71 aaaerrta that the z90eaeay punctian uptee m 
Fig. 1. 
We assume that the frame ?V is represented within EA in a natural Kalmar 
elementary way. Let h be the usual Solovay function associated with -1y-, i.e. (provably 
in ICI) 
h(0) = 0; 
if z> h(m) and PrjF(m,r/ # z’), 
h(m) if no such z exists; 
where / denotes the limit of h. 
Clearly, ZC, proves that the limit e exists. Hence, despite W being infinite, all the 
standard properties of Solovay function are provable in ZZ,. 
Define for i = 0, 1 
Ci:= {Cj,iljE~)) 
and put 
7c:=&ECouCru{O}. 
To verify statement (a) of our lemma note that by the construction of w 
F I- 7!EC1-+7r A Pryri7c1. 
Hence, if for some n 2 1 
F I- Co?P(F) A 71-+ Con(F + rc), 
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then 
It follows that h must leave the bottom node and this is impossible. 
To check (b) we reason inside ZC,: “By properties of Solovay function and by the 
construction of W, for every n 2 1 
r t- [EC0 A Con”+‘(q+ Con(9- + n+ CodyF)). 
Hence, if for some n 
F I- 71 A Con”(F)+ Pr,‘Al A 1 A, 
then 
F k Z!E& A Con"+'(Y-)+ Con(Y'+ 1 A). 
By provable C,-completeness we also have 
thus 
LT t- con”+‘(_?T)+&$c&. 
It follows that for all u E Co such that d(u) > n, 
Therefore, as there are elements of C,, of arbitrary finite depth, h must eventually quit 
the bottom node. Since 0 is the only element of W of depth o, the function h leaves 0 if 
and only if the theory FW is inconsistent, hence the result.” 0 
Consider now the extension (5, Fm + x), where z is defined as in Lemma 6.1. By 
part (a) of this lemma, the theory FU + n is not reflexive over F-; hence 
PRL(F, Fa + n) does not contain (R). Part (b), in turn, guarantees that 
PRL( F-, To + n) contains (I), therefore, 
PRL(F, Fm + n) # ICP, 
as required. 
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7. Provability logics for recursive progressions of theories based on iteration 
of consistency 
There are at least two ways to formalize the definition (Tl)-(T3) of transfinite 
progressions of theories based on iteration of consistency. One relies on a concept of a, 
say, Kalmar elementary well-ordering (as e.g. in [15]), and the other one relies on the 
alternative concept of a system of ordinal notation (as in [9]). Let me briefly consider 
the easier approach first. 
7.1. Progressions along Kalmar elementary well-orderings 
A Kalmar elementary well-ordering (D, <) is a relative interpretation of the first- 
order theory of linear orderings in EA with domain D, such that x ED and x Q y are 
elementary formulas and the relation Q well-orders the set D in the standard model of 
EA. (Without loss of generality we also assume that 0 is the least element of D. For any 
a ED, 1 a 1 will denote the order type of {b ED ) b <a} in the standard model.) 
An elementary formula Ax~(z; x) is said to enumerate a progression based on 
iteration of consistency along (D, Q) iff for a given initial theory 9, 
EA I- Vx, z[AxT(z; x)t~Axr(x) v (z~D A 3u < x 
(UED A u QZ A x = rCon(Fi)l)]. 
Here YU denotes the theory numerated by AxF(ti; x). For the sake of readability we 
shall also write Pr,(z; x) for PrZ(x). 
Clearly, such enumeration formulas can be constructed via the arithmetical Fixed 
Point Theorem for any given Kalmar elementary well-ordering (D, =z). Easy (meta- 
mathematical) transfinite induction then shows that ( Yz)ZED is a strictly increasing (in 
the sense of <) sequence of sound theories, satisfying (Tl)-(T3) Moreover, the fact 
that (D, <) is an interpretation of the theory of linear orderings in EA guarantees that 
EA proves the formal analogs of (Tl)-(T3): 
Pl) EA F u = 0 v u$D + Vx(PrF(u; x)t, Pr,(x)); 
(W EA k u = SC(U)+ Vx(Pr,(u; x)+-+PrF(u; ‘Con(Fi)l ix)); 
(D3) EA F Lim(u)+ Vx(Pr,(u;x)cr3zED(z QU A PrF(u;x))). 
Here u = SC(U) denotes the formula 
and Lim(u) abbreviates 
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Note that enumeration formulas for progressions based on iteration of consistency 
are defined in such a way as to satisfy the following natural properties: 
(1) (Provable monotonicity) 
EA F u, VED A u QU + Vx(AxF(u; x) + Ax&v; x)). 
(2) (Provable II, axiomatizability) 
EA F u~D+Vx(Ax~(u;x)+ Ax,(x) v XED,). 
These properties together with (D2) and (D3) imply that 
EA F Lim(u) A zeD A z<u+Vx(Pr,(u;~)+Pr,(u;~Con(~+i)~)) 
(7.1) 
and 
EA k v = SC(U) A z <v A ZED-+ Vx(Pr,(v; x) c* Pr,(z;rCon(Fi)li x)) 
(7.2) 
A Kalmar elementary well-ordering (D, C) is called reasonable iff the formulas 
v = SC(U) and Lim(u) are equivalent in EA to elementary ones. It follows from (7.1) 
and (7.2) that for any reasonable Kalmar elementary well-ordering, if a, b E D and 
a Q b, then 
(a) the theory z is provably reflexive over Z, whenever 1 b 1 is a limit ordinal; 
(b) s is provably finitely axiomatizable over z, whenever 1 b 1 is a successor. 
For any ordinal I, let 5?A denote the propositional modal language containing 
modal operators [a] for all ordinals CI < 2. Fix a Kalmar elementary well-ordering 
(D, <) of order type /1, and let (%)ZED be a progression based on iteration of 
consistency along (D, e). The provability logic for ( zIzeD in the language 9A (denoted 
PRL( z)=.n) is then defined in the usual way: each modal operator [or] is understood 
as the provability predicate in the theory z, with 1 a 1 = a. 
Theorem 7.1. If the ordering (D, <) is reasonable, then PRL( K)Z.r, is axiomatized by 
all the rules and axiom schemes of RP for each pair of ordinals c( < fi < I, fi a limit, 
together with the scheme: 
(Z) [a+n+ 114 c, [O](l[O]“[a]l+~), n~fY4. 
Proof. Let TLn denote the system described above. Properties (a) and (b) ensure that 
TLd is arithmetically sound. (To check (Z) show by induction on n using (2) that for all 
nEN and all aeD, 
EA t- 1 Pr’& rl Con(%)l - Con(%), 
provided lb1 = [al + n.) 
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For the completeness, note that the scheme (Z) allows to get rid of all the modal 
operators corresponding to successor ordinals. The result follows by Remark 
5.17. 0 
Corollary 7.2. PRL(z)),,, is decidable. 
Remark 7.3. Clearly, all natural Kalmar elementary well-orderings are reasonable. 
Actually, reasonableness is only a minor part of what one would expect from natural 
well-orderings. 
It is not difficult to see that there exist reasonable Kalmar elementary well- 
orderings of arbitrary recursive order types, for if (D, -x) is a Kalmar elementary 
well-ordering of order type L, then the ordering (D’, 4) given by 
D’:= {(X,ri)lXED, neNj 
and 
(x, m) <'(Y, n) :o (x<yor(x=yandm<n)), 
has order type w - 2 and is reasonable. Therefore, the ordering (D”, 4), with 
D” := {x E D’ 1 x <‘a}, a ED and 1 a 1 = 2, is reasonable and has precisely the order 
type 2. 
To demonstrate that there exist Kalmar elementary well-orderings of arbitrary 
recursive order types 2, recall that even a stronger result is well-known (cf. [13]):for 
any 1, there is a Kalmar elementary subset D of (the set of codes of) rational numbers 
Q such that the ordering (D, <Q), <Q being the standard ordering of Q, has order 
type 2. 
Evidently, EA proves that <o linearly orders the set Q (and therefore, the set D). 
Hence (D, cQ) is the desired interpretation. 
Remark 7.4. Note that specific well-order properties of (D, <) are inessential for the 
proof of Theorem 7.1, and we only need the least number principle for, say, arithmeti- 
cal subsets of D to show that all theories in progressions based on iteration of 
consistency along D are sound. Therefore, Theorem 7.1 holds for Kalmar elementary 
reasonable quasi-well-orderings as well. 
7.2. Progressions for systems of ordinal notation 
For simplicity, in this section we shall assume all theories to contain Peano 
Arithmetic PA. 
A primitive recursive (p.r.) system of ordinal notation Y is given by specifying a subset 
S c lV and a function ) * 1 mapping S onto an initial segment of ordinal numbers s.t. the 
following conditions hold: 
(1) 0~s and tlx~S (1x1 = 0 o x = 0); 
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(2) there are a p.r. relation Sues(x) and a p.r. function ps(x) s.t. 
Vx~S(Suc~(x) o 1 x 1 is a successor ordinal) 
and 
VXES(SUCs(X) ==- IxI= Ips(x)l+ 1). 
(3) there is a p.r. functionfSs(x, n) s.t. 
vxEs(1suc,(x) A x # 0 
=z= An. \fss(x, n)) is a fundamental sequence for the limit ordinal 
1x1). 
Given a system of ordinal notation 9 define 
Ems(x) : = 7 Sues(x) A x # 0; 
I 
0 if x = 0, 
xsCn1: = ps(x) if Sue,(x), 
j&(x, n) if Lim,(x). 
Thus, xs[n] is a p.r. function in x and n. Note that for all n E N and all x E S\{O}, 
lxsCnll< 1x1. 
We shall write x <sy for the expression “there are k, nI, . . . , nk such that 
x = y,[nr] . . ..[Q] or x = y”. Clearly ds is a partial order on S. 
Let Y be any p.r. system of ordinal notation. An Y-progression bused on iteration of 
consistency is a family of theories (K)z.s given by a C,-formula Ax~(z; x), for each 
ZE N numerating the axioms of a theory K:, s.t. 
(Fl) PA t- VX(AX~(O; x) ++ AXE), where Y is a given ‘initial’ theory; 
(F2) PA t Sues(z) + Vx [Ax,(z; x) * Ax&s(z); x) v x = ‘Con(q,ci,)‘]; 
(F3) PA k Lims(z) + Vx [Ax~(z; x) c* 3nAx~(fis(z, n); x)]. 
Our goal is to give an example of a system of ordinal notation 9, s.t. 
(1) %” gives exactly one notation to each constructive ordinal; 
(2) for every %“-progression ( z))rsz based on iteration of consistency, if a, bEZ, 
1 a ) < ) b ) and ) b ) is a limit ordinal, then the theory s is provably reflexive over z. 
The main technical problem in constructing such a system is the absence, in general, 
of the provable monotonicity property for progressions satisfying (Fl)-(F3). In order 
to overcome the analogous difficulty in the theory of hierarchies of recursive func- 
tions, Schmidt [16] introduced the concept of the built-up system of ordinal notation. 
Here we will construct such a system, which is provably and primitively recursively 
built-up and gives notations uniformly to all constructive ordinals (cf. also [14, 
pp. 48-551). In particular, this gives an answer to a question of Rose ([ 14, p. 55]), for 
what classes of ordinals there exist primitively recursively built-up systems of ordinal 
notation. 
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First we fix a standard Kalmar elementary coding of finite strings of natural 
numbers. (a)i denotes the (i + 1)th element, and #z(a) denotes the length of a string 
(coded by) a. Assume without loss of generality that the empty string is coded by 0 and 
that each number is a code of a suitable string. Let @ denote the concatenation 
function and let * denote the operation of adding a new element at the end of a string, 
thus 
(a~, . . . . u,)*b=(q, . . . . a,)O(b)=(u,, . . . . a,,b). 
We also assume that obvious properties of these operations are provable in PA. 
Further, fix a universal pr. function for all Kalmar elementary ones, as e.g. in [14]. 
The expression {e} (x) will denote the value of the Kalmar elementary function with 
index e on argument x, if e is an index, and 0 otherwise. We assume that 0 is not an 
index of any function. 
The system of ordinal notation 0 ’ is given by the following clauses: 
(1) oEo+ and lOI= 0; 
(2) ifu~O+ then u*OCZO+ and la*01 = (al + 1; 
(3) ifu~O+ and f(n) is a one-place Kulmur elementary function s.t. tin (f(n)EO+ 
and f(n) # 0), then for any index e of the function f, a* eEO+ and \ a* e 1 = 
lal + CnaOl.f(n)l. 
(4) Every UEO+ is obtained by either of the clauses (l), (2) or (3). 
Clearly, by transfinite induction, for each ordinal LX, clauses (l))(4) uniquely deter- 
mine the set of all notations a E O+ s.t. I a ) = a. 
Lemma 7.5 For all a, bgO+ u@bcO+ and Ia@bI = Ial + Jbl. 
Proof. By transfinite induction on I b 1. For I b ( = 0 the statement is obvious. 
If b = c*O, then by the induction hypothesis /aGjbl = lu@cl + 1 = 
I a I + I c) + 1 = ( a I + I b I. If b = c * e, where e > 0, then, using the induction hypothe- 
sis again, 
laObl=luOc*el=la@cl-t c ({e}(n)I=lal+lbl. 0 
?I>0 
Note that the ordinal-notational summation @ is (provably) associative (because 
the concatenation of strings is). 
Further define: 
Suc+(a):=(a #O A (a)lh(Oj_-l =O), 
((alo, . . . ,(a)~+~) if &AC+ (a), 
otherwise; 
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fi+(a, n):= 
b@CF<n{e}(i) if u=b*e and e>O, 
0 . otherwise. 
Clearly, p+(a) is the required (Kalmar elementary) predecessor function for the 
notation system I%‘+. Thatfi+ (a, n) is a fundamental sequence function for 0+ follows 
from Lemma 7.5. Note thatfs+ is not Kalmar elementary, but is primitive recursive 
(since the function (e} (n) is). However, for every fixed a the function An .fi’ (a, n) is 
Kalmar elementary. 
Informally speaking, the system U ’ is a version of the system 0 of Church and 
Kleene with Kalmar elementary fundamental sequences, based on summation of 
ordinals rather than on the operation of taking usual limits, as in 0. Hence it is easy to 
define a Kalmar elementary function I s.t. for all UE 0, r(u) E O+ and ( r(a) 1 > 1 a I. 
Therefore, by a well-known result of Kleene, O+ gives notations to all constructive 
ordinals. 
Next we prove some useful properties of the introduced operations. For the sake of 
brevity denote the function uO+ [n] and the relation Q~+, respectively, a [n] and < + . 
Lemma 7.6. PA E Vu, b, n (b # 0 -+ (a 0 b) Cnl = u 0 bCn1). 
Proof. Reasoning inside PA: “If SC+(~) then b has the form c *O with p+(b) = c. 
Hence a 0 b[n] = a 0 c = (a 0 b) [n]. 
If Lim+ (b) then b has the form c * e with e > 0. It follows that 
a 0 b[n] = a @ c @ (xi”, n {e} (i)) = (a 0 b) [n] by associativity of 0 .” 0 , 
Lemma 7.7. For all a, beO+ a d+uOb. 
Proof. First of all, it is easily seen that for all b E O+ 0 < + b, because the sequence of 
ordinals ) b 1, ) b[O] 1, ) b[O] [0] 1, . . . is strictly decreasing until it reaches 0. 
Now for any a E 0 +, iterating [0] sufficiently many times by Lemma 7.6 
(u0b)[0]~~-[O]=u0(b[O]~~~[0])=u@O=u. 
The statement of our lemma follows immediately. 
Lemma 7.8. For all a, 6, c E O+, if a<+c<+a@b then there is a d<+b such that 
c=uOd. 
Proof. By transfinite induction on 1 b I. If 1 bl = 0 then, clearly, c = a = a 0 0 and we 
can take d = 0. 
Iflbl >Oandc~+uObthen,bythedefinition,eitherc=uOborc~+u0b[n] 
for some n. In the first case we are done by taking d = b. In the second, since 
1 b [n] I < b the inductive hypothesis is applicable and hence there is a d < + b [n] d + b 
such that c = a 0 d. 0 
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Lemma 7.9. The order relation < + on 0’ is treelike, i.e. for all a E 0’ the set 
{c~O+lcb+a} is linearly ordered by 6+. 
Proof. By induction on 1 a I. For a = 0 and ) a 1 a successor the statement is obvious. 
Suppose now that 1 a 1 is a limit ordinal and consider any two elements ci, c2 < +a. We 
have to show that either cl d +cz or c2 d +cl. 
This is clear in case that one of cr, c2 equals a. If both ci, c2 # a then for some 
n,, n, EN c1 6 +a[nI] and c2 d +a[nz]. Now observe that by Lemma 7.7 the funda- 
mental sequences for all the notations from O+ are monotone in the sense of < +. 
Hence for n = max(ni, nz) both c1 and c2 are < +a[n] and the induction hypothesis 
yields the statement of our lemma. q 
Now we are going to define a special ordinal exponentiation function within the 
system of notation 8+. Let for any z and x t(z,x) denote the natural index of the 
Kalmar elementary function f(n) given by the following scheme: 
f(n + 1) = {z3 (xCn1). 
Clearly, 5 itself is Kalmar elementary. Next define, via the (formalized version of 
the) Recursion Theorem an index w s.t. (provably in PA) for all XE N 
‘w’ (‘) = { ii)(w, x)) 
if x = 0, 
otherwise; 
and put 
ox:= {w} (x). 
Lemma 7.10. For all aEO+ C#E O+ and 1 d’ 1 = cdOl. 
Proof. By transfinite induction on ( a I. For a = 0 the statement is obvious, Otherwise, 
wLI = (e), where {e} (0) = (0) and for all n E N {e} (n + 1) = &[“I. By the induction 
hypothesis eYtnl~O+\{O}. Hence IZD“EO+ and Iw’( = ~.,,l{e} (n)[ = 
1 + EnSO &tnl’ = cP’, since ordinals of the form ma are closed under summa- 
tion. 0 
Lemma 7.11. For all a,eEO+, a # 0, if a < + we then there exist b, d EO+ s.t. 
a = b @od. 
Proof. By induction on I e 1. Suppose that a < + me, then, since < + is treelike, either 
O<+aQ+w”[O] or for some nEN o”[n] < + a d +oY[n + 11. Note that since 
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0 # a < + me, clearly e # 0 and hence o”[O] = (0). Therefore, in the first case we have 
a = (0) and one may take b = 0, d = 0. 
In the second case we have by the definition of ox that 
whence by Lemma 7.8 there is a a’ < + &[“I, a’ # 0 s.t. a = o”[n] @ a’. In case 
a’ = wet”] we are done. Otherwise by the induction hypothesis there exist U, u E O+ s.t. 
a’ = u @ w”. Hence by associativity of @ 
a = (w”[n] 0 u) 0 0”. 0 
Now we are in a position to construct the required system of ordinal notation 
9’ which will be in fact a certain path through O+. Thus we only have to define the set 
2 of notations from %” (other functions and predicates necessary for a system of 
ordinal notations are the same that in of). 
Let uo,ul, . . . be a (nonrecursive) enumeration of all the elements of O+. Define 
Clearly, by Lemmas 7.7 and 7.8 the relation < , + linearly orders the set 2. Besides, 
every a E Z, a # 0 has the form b @ od for suitable b and d E O+. (Pick a number n E N 
such that 
and apply Lemmas 7.8 and 7.11.) 
From this we derive the following property of 9’ (which, in particular, says that d is 
provably and primitively recursively built-up): 
Lemma 7.12. For every UEZ, 1 a 1 a limit, (PA proves that) for all no N, either 
u[n + l] = u[n] 0 (0) or u[n + l] [0] = u[n] 0 (0). 
Proof. Pick any a E Z, 1 a 1 limit. Since a E Z and the functions @ and ox are Kalmar 
elementary, for appropriate b and d EO+ PA k ti = 60 wd and hence, by 
Lemma 7.6, 
PA k VnZ[n-j = 60 w”[n]. 
Note that since 1 a ) is a limit ordinal, d # 0. Hence, by the definition of ox 
PA k vn w$l + l] = od[ n] 0 eY[n’. 
Now using the fact that 
PA I- Vz,x{5(z,x)}(O) = (0) 
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conclude 
PA F Vx(x #O+ o”[O] = {5(w,x))(O) = (0)) 
and hence 
PA E Vn(d[n] = 0 v w”[“‘[O] = (0)). 
It follows that 
PA t- t/n [o*[n + l] = o”[n] @ ~0’ = o”[n] @ (0) 
v w”[n + l] [O] = o”[n] @ Wzt~l[O] = o”[n] 0 (O)]. 
From this lemma we obtain the required corollary: 
0 
Lemma 7.13. Let ( Fz)zsz be any d-progression based on iteration of consistency. Then 
for all a,bEZ, iflu < lb/ and (bl . IS a limit ordinal, then the theory % is provably 
reflexive over z. 
Proof. First note that for any %“-progression 
PA k Va,x,n(Pr,(a[n];x)+ PrAa;x)) 
(this is readily seen from clauses (Fl)-(F3) of the definition of a progression). 
Hence for every limit b E Z by Lemma 7.12 
PA F Vx, n(Pr,(F[n] 0 (0); x) --) Pr_&[n + 11; x)). 
It follows that for all such b 
PA k Vx,n,m(m < n A Pr,(F[m];x)-+ Pr,(L[n];x)) (7.3) 
and 
PA k VmPrT(& rCon(F&l). 
(7.3) and (F3) guarantee that 
(7.4) 
PA F Vx(PrY(b;x) c, !lkPr,(b[k];x)). (7.5) 
On the other hand, for every a < + b there exists a number m such that a < + b [m] 
and therefore 
PA I- Vx(Pr(G;x)+ Pr(&fi];x)). 
Hence 
(7.6) 
PA k Vx(PrT(&,x)+ 3nPr, ‘Con(9$,)--+ Con(% + a)l). 
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(One should take n = max(k, m), k and m given by (7.5) and (7.6), respectively). 
By (7.4) it follows that 
PA E Vx(Pr,(&x)--+ Pr,‘Con(K + x)l). 0 
Corollary 7.14. For any .9’-progression based on iteration of consistency, 
PRL(X,%) 2 (R), 
provided a < + b E .T?T and 1 b ) is a limit ordinal. 
Arbitrary progressions satisfying (Fl)-(F3) need not, in general, satisfy the provable 
II,-axiomatizability property, which is also substantial for the good behavior of 
provability logics (cf. [S]). However, an easy fixed point argument shows the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 7.15. For any system of ordinal notation 9, there exists an Y-progression 
(z)=.s based on iteration of consistency, s.t. 
(F4) PA E Vx(Ax,(z;x)-+ Axr(x) v XEI7,). 
For this kind of progressions from Lemma 2.5, we immediately obtain the following 
corollary. 
Corollary 7.16. Let ( z)zEs be an Y-progression satisfying (Fl)-(F4). Then the theory 
6 is provably finitely axiomatizable over Z and, therefore, 
PRL(T&s) = ICP, 
whenever a < + b E %” and 1 b 1 is a successor ordinal. 
Combining Corollaries 7.14 and 7.16 as in the proof of Theorem 7.1, we obtain an 
even stronger result. 
Theorem 7.17. For any %“-progression ( z)zEz satisfying (Fl)-(F4) 
PRL(Z))zpz = TL,, 
where o1 denotes the least nonconstructive ordinal of Church and Kleene. 
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